Why š¦ AI-Safety picked: Hitachi Energy SOI
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Source: cisa.gov
Hitachi Energy SOI khardwood Oct 06, 2026 Release DateOctober 06, 2026 Description<p><a href="https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-279-04.json" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">View CSAF</a></p>Summary<p>Hitachi Energy is aware of RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ component of SOI product versions listed in this document. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to carry out various attacks affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the product. Please refer to the Recommended Immediate Actions for information about the mitigation/remediation.</p><p>The following versions of Hitachi Energy SOI are affected:</p>SOI vers:SOI/>=2.0.0|<=2.2.0 (CVE-2026-34197)CVSSVendorEquipmentv3 8.8Hitachi EnergySOI1 VulnerabilityImproper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')BackgroundCritical Infrastructure Sectors: EnergyCountries/Areas Deployed: WorldwideCompany Headquarters Location: SwitzerlandVulnerabilitiesCVE-2026-34197Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ used in SOI product. Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String) and BrokerService.addConnector(String). An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec().<a href="https://www.cisa.gov/" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">Read More</a>1 Affected ProductSOI Version 2.0.0 to 2.2.0<p>Product Status: known_affected</p>Remediations<p>Vendor fix<br/>Apply the patch SOI EP2, which upgrades the ActiveMQ version (JMS message broker) for the SOI Core to version 5.19.5. EP2 is a cumulative patch that covers previous EP1 patch. EP2 also upgrades the SOI management scripts to the latest version and installs an upgraded OpenJDK version 11 to run ActiveMQ MESSAGE BROKER in the newer JRE. It also upgrades the ActiveMQ client libraries installed in the WildFly module.</p><p>Mitigation<br/>Follow General Mitigation Factors/Workarounds and refer to the product deployment guidelines for securing the product environment.</p>Additional Metrics<p>Relevant CWE:<a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')</a></p>CVSS VersionBase ScoreBase SeverityVector String3.18.8HIGH<a href="https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H</a><p><a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34197" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">View CVE Details</a></p>AcknowledgmentsHitachi Energy Internal Team reported this vulnerability to CISA.Notice<p>The information in this document is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Hitachi Energy. Hitachi Energy provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall Hitachi Energy or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if Hitachi Energy or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from Hitachi Energy and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose. All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.</p>Support<p>For additional information and support please contact your product provider or Hitachi Energy service organization. For contact information, see https://www.hitachienergy.com/contact-us/ for Hitachi Energy contact-centers.</p>General Mitigation Factors<p>Recommended security practices and firewall configurations can help protect a process control network from attacks that originate from outside the network. Such practices include that process control systems are physically protected from direct access by unauthorized personnel, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed, and others that have to be evaluated case by case. Process control systems should not be used for Internet surfing, instant messaging, or receiving e-mails. Portable computers and removable storage media should be carefully scanned for viruses before they are connected to a control system. Proper password policies and processes should be followed. Additional information on Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices can be found in the Hitachi Energyās āIndustrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Best Practicesā Cybersecurity Notification. [1]</p>SSVC<p>SSVCv2/E:N/A:N/2026-09-28T14:31:35Z/</p>Legal Notice and Terms of Use<p>This product is provided subject to this Notification (https://www.cisa.gov/notification) and this Privacy & Use policy (https://www.cisa.gov/privacy-policy).</p>Recommended Practices<p>CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the exploitation risk of these vulnerabilities.</p>Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, and ensure they are not accessible from the internet.Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks.When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most recent version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as its connected devices.<p>CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.</p><p>CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on cisa.gov. Several CISA products detailing cyber defense best practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.</p><p>CISA encourages organizations to implement recommended cybersecurity strategies for proactive defense of ICS assets. Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage at cisa.gov in the technical information paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B--Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.</p><p>Organizations observing suspected malicious activity should follow established internal procedures and report findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.</p>Advisory Conversion Disclaimer<p>This ICSA is a verbatim republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000244 from a direct conversion of the vendor's Common Security Advisory Framework (CSAF) advisory. This is republished to CISA's website as a means of increasing visibility and is provided "as-is" for informational purposes only. CISA is not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories and provides no warranties of any kind regarding any information contained within this advisory. Further, CISA does not endorse any commercial product or service. Please contact Hitachi Energy PSIRT directly for any questions regarding this advisory.</p>Revision HistoryInitial Release Date: 2026-09-29DateRevisionSummary2026-09-291Initial public release2026-10-062Initial CISA Republication of Hitachi Energy PSIRT 8DBD000244 advisoryLegal Notice and Terms of Use Advisory TypeICS Advisory Topics<a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems/industrial-control-system-vulnerabilities" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">Industrial Control System Vulnerabilities</a>, <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/industrial-control-systems" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">Industrial Control Systems</a> Alert CodeICSA-26-279-04 Sector<a href="https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/energy-sector" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer ugc" target="_blank">Energy Sector</a> VendorHitachi Energy Show 'Key Takeaways' blockOff On